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ABSTRACT
Terrorism is an increasing problem; still, research systematically
investigating the impact of varying kinds of terrorism is scarce.
The present investigation uses hypothetical scenarios to look at
effects of diverging sorts of terrorism on risk perceptions in a
student- and a tourist sample. Two characteristics of terrorism
were varied systematically: frequency (whether terrorism hits a
destination where terrorism is frequent or infrequent) and degree
of organization (whether terrorism is committed by an
organization or by an isolated perpetrator). Results show that both
variables affect the level of perceived risk. Results are also in line
with prospect theory’s [Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979).
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica,
47 (2), 263–291] predictions regarding changes in risk perceptions.
Findings thus provide a taxonomy of how terror characteristics
affect level of and changes in perceived risk. This taxonomy might
possibly be useful for predicting tourists travel decisions and
behaviour.
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Terrorism has been termed “a new species of trouble” where the stakes are high and the
uncertainties enormous (Slovic, 2002) and there has been an intensive focus on the risk
which terrorism imposes on modern societies. This is evident both in the social sciences
and in the public discourse. Nolen-Hoeksema (2010) has claimed that an impression of
an overflow of natural disasters, political crises, and acts of terror and war exists in the
public’s awareness, which has been created by mass media since the turn of the
century. Examples of political crises and terrorism are many and attacks vary in character-
istics from those that are carried out by terrorist organizations (e.g. 9/11) to those that are
committed by isolated perpetrators (e.g. the 22nd of July in Norway). And while most ter-
rorism is concentrated in a few countries (Global Terrorism Index Report, 2014), even
countries that previously had been spared from terrorist attacks have been hit during
the last decade (e.g. Charlie Hebdo). Indeed, the mere number of such events seems to
justify this supposed impression in the public’s awareness: As the Global Terrorism
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Index Report (2014) has shown, there has been more than a five-fold increase in fatalities
caused by terrorism since the turn of the century, rising from 3.361 in 2000 to 17.958 in
2013. Nonetheless, the report also showed that over 80% of all terrorism occurred in
only five countries, rendering the rest of the world as rather terrorism free.
Literature review
Subjective or perceived risk is defined as the individual’s perception of the probability of
certain negative outcomes weighed by the magnitude of these outcomes (Brun, 1994).
Within the tourism domain, risk perceptions have been found to correlate with travel
anxiety (Reisinger & Mavondo, 2005) and with destination choice (Sönmez & Graefe,
1998). Worry, on the other hand, is a key component of anxiety, and is characterized by
a tendency to view ambiguous or uncertain situations as threatening (Butler &
Mathews, 1987; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). In some cases,
worry has been shown to be a better predictor of behaviour than risk perceptions (for
example: Cameron & Reeve, 2006; Peters, Slovic, Hibbard, & Tusler, 2006).
The heightened attention given to the risk of terrorism is accompanied by a steadily
increasing number of publications on the topic both within generic and applied domains.
Still, there seems to be a surprising scarcity of research that moves beyond simple case
studies and systematically investigates the impact of varying kinds of terrorism on the
public in general and on the tourist population in particular. The aim of the present investi-
gation therefore is to look at the specific effects of diverging sorts of terror on risk percep-
tions and worry. More specifically, it will be investigated whether terrorism committed by
an organization is perceived differently from terrorism which is committed by an isolated
individual, and furthermore, whether terrorism hitting a country where terror is frequent
is perceived differently from terrorism hitting a country where terror is infrequent.
Within the tourism domain, statistics in many cases showed that the number of visiting
tourists declined somewhat after terrorist attacks, for example, in Spain (Enders & Sandler,
1991), China (Gartner & Shen, 1992), Egypt (Wahab, 1996), Northern Ireland (Pizam, 1999),
and the USA (Lepp & Gibson, 2003). Some research also focuses on how tourists perceive
the risk of terrorism. It is evident from this research that tourists’ perceptions of risk are
effected by various events. Nonetheless, the effect of terrorism on risk perceptions is
not as extensive as could be expected from the above-mentioned discourse and the
extensive focus on the matter. Reisinger and Mavondo (2005) found risk perceptions to
be correlated with travel anxiety and Sönmez and Graefe (1998) found that risk percep-
tions influenced destination choice among tourists. Gray and Wilson (2009) showed that
political hazards, like terrorism, were perceived as more risky than physical and social
hazards like, for example, the weather or a strange culture. In line with this, they reported
that travel desire was reduced to a greater extent by political hazards than by physical and
social ones. Sjöberg (2005) reported that perceived terrorism risk was quite low in a
Swedish sample, and that participants judged others to be more at risk than themselves.
Research also showed that tourists may disregard governmental advisories and travel to
destinations threatened by terrorism (Fuchs, Uriely, Reichel, & Maoz, 2012; Uriely, Maoz,
& Reichel, 2007).
In order to study the direct effect of terror attacks on risk perceptions, one needs to
compare before- and after measures of perceived risk for a given terror struck destination.
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Since terrorism in its very nature is unpredictable and since it is impossible to know where
the next attack will hit, such data are, of course, very difficult to obtain. Still, there are some
examples of research that has studied before- and after effects of terrorism on risk percep-
tions. In doing so, these investigations avoid a large number of problems that are associ-
ated with employing after-measures only, like, for example, hind sight bias, faulty
memories and perceptions skewed by expectations.
Larsen, Brun, Øgaard, and Selstad (2011) investigated the effect of the train bombings
in Madrid in 2004 and the effect of the bomb attacks on London’s public transport system
in 2005. They found that participants’ general desire to travel and risk judgements for
other destinations remained unchanged. However, there were direct effects of the
terror attacks on tourists’ perceived risk regarding Madrid and London, respectively. Par-
ticipants reported increased risk perceptions for Madrid as a holiday destination, and for
London, as a holiday destination the year following each attack. Brun, Wolff, and Larsen
(2011) found that the terrorist attacks in London and Sharm el Sheik in 2005 were associ-
ated with an increase in tourists’ worries about terrorism, as well as an increase in the per-
centage of tourists who believed that the world had become more dangerous as a
consequence of the “War on terror”.
The present investigation is particularly concerned with findings reported by Wolff and
Larsen (2014) who investigated tourists’ risk perceptions and worries before and after the
July 22nd attacks in Norway in 2011. They found that risk perceptions and worry remained
constant for several years, and were unaffected during the first few weeks following the
attack. However, in 2012, they observed a decline in risk perceptions and worries regard-
ing terrorism among both domestic and international tourists. Furthermore, in 2012, there
was a substantial proportion of participants who believed that Norway (but not the world)
had become safer after the terror attacks in 2011. The authors discussed several possible
explanations and speculated whether this counterintuitive finding could be understood as
a case of the gambler’s fallacy.
The gambler’s fallacy is a well-known cognitive bias where people assume that chance
is a self-correcting process, where aberrations in one direction make aberrations in the
opposite direction more likely so that the equilibrium will be restored (Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1971, 1974). An example typically used to illustrate the phenomenon is coin-
tossing: People often believe that getting several heads in a row, increases the chances
for getting a tail on the next flip. Following this logic, Wolff and Larsen (2014) wondered
whether participants in their study might have fallen victim to the gambler’s fallacy. If tour-
ists perceived Norway as a safe destination which had been hit by a random perpetrator,
they might (erroneously) conclude that this by itself reduces the likelihood of terrorism
during the near future. The authors called for future research to investigate this question.
If the findings by Wolff and Larsen (2014) are to be a case of the gambler’s fallacy, at
least two conditions need to be fulfilled. First, the event must be seen as very rare and unli-
kely, that is, tourists must perceive Norway as a very safe country, free from terrorism. Data
indicate that this is the case (Larsen et al., 2011; Wolff & Larsen, 2014). Second, the event
must be perceived as a random event. In the case of terrorism, this might mean that it is
not committed by an organization with numerous supporters, but rather by an isolated,
deranged (and captured) individual. The 22nd of July attacks also seem to fulfil this con-
dition. Experts have described the perpetrator as a black swan (for example: Kristiansen,
2012) and a lone wolf (for example: Mudde, 2011), and there have been conflicting
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reports and widespread discussions regarding his sanity in the popular media (for
example: Andersen, Grivi Brenna, Ravndal, Hopperstad, & Vikås, 2011).
One might argue that it is not the terror event itself, but rather the means that are
undertaken in order to prevent future terror events that reduce people’s risk perceptions
following the 22nd of July. However, reviewing 36 peer-reviewed studies on the effect of
terrorism on tourism, Voltes-Dorta, Jiménez, and Suárez-Alemán (2015) concluded that the
reported study by Wolff and Larsen (2014) was the only one that did not reach the
expected conclusion that terrorism had a negative effect on tourism. Seemingly, the
22nd of July attacks studied by Wolff and Larsen (2014) have some characteristics that
are not shared by most of the terror attacks reported in the literature, which may be
the reason why risk perceptions decreased in this particular case, but not in the other
cases. As discussed by Wolff and Larsen (2014), terror attacks studied in previous research,
are often executed by terrorist organizations, like the ETA in Spain, the IRA in Northern
Ireland, Al Qaida in the USA, or the Hamas in the Middle East. This holds true for the
studies of the London and Madrid bombings (Larsen et al., 2011) and the Sharm el
Sheik attacks (Brun et al., 2011) which both found increased risk perceptions following
terror. The case of the 22nd of July terror seems to differ from these kinds of terrorism,
in that it hit a destination which is not normally ridden by terrorism and in that the perpe-
trator was an isolated individual, not part of a terror organization.
From the discussion above, it is apparent that various features of terrorism, like the
degree of organization or the frequency with which it hits a given destination, might
affect risk perceptions and worries quite differently. The aim of the present study therefore
is twofold. First, it aims at investigating whether the counterintuitive decline in worry and
risk perceptions following the 22nd of July, reported by Wolff and Larsen (2014), can be
explained by the gambler’s fallacy. The second purpose is more generally to study the
effect of various terrorism characteristics on risk perceptions and worry.
This can only be done by experimental research which systematically varies the dimen-
sions of interest, keeping all other variables constant. Therefore, hypothetical scenarios
were employed which systematically varied the two characteristics of terrorism in focus,
that is frequency (whether terrorism hits a country where terrorism is frequent or infre-
quent) and degree of organization (whether terrorism is committed by an organization
or by an isolated perpetrator).
Several hypotheses about the effects of frequency and degree of organization on risk
perceptions and worry are reasonable:
First, it is reasonable to expect that risk perceptions will be higher at destinations where
terrorism is frequent and at destinations where terrorism is committed by organizations,
and most likely risk perceptions will be highest at places where terrorism is both frequent
and organized. In other words, there will be positive main effects of frequency and degree
of organization on risk perceptions and worry.
Second, prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) predicts that the impact of a
given change in probability increases as probability approaches impossibility and cer-
tainty. For example, if the perceived probability of terrorism changes from close to
none (impossibility) to 1%, this will have a greater impact on risk perceptions than
changes from 10% to 11%. According to prospect theory, it is the relative, not the absolute,
increase in probability that is important. In these terms, an increase from 0% to 1% looms
larger than an increase from 10% to 11%. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated, for
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example, that people may drive across town to buy a $10 calculator instead of a $15 one,
but forego the same trip to purchase a $125 jacket for $5 less; because they illogically
believe that the greater percentage saved on the calculator makes the trip more worth-
while. This psychophysical notion of diminishing sensitivity has been consistently demon-
strated across many domains (for example: Fechner, 1860; Rottenstreich & Hse, 2001;
Winter & Parker, 2007).
Since it is unreasonable to assume that the perceived probability of being hit by terror-
ism at a destination approaches certainty (100%), prospect theory predicts that changes in
terror probability will have decreasing impact the more they depart from zero probability.
In other words, the higher the perceived baseline risk, the less impact terror attacks will
have, and the less risk perceptions will change because of them. Prospect theory therefore
predicts that the largest changes in risk perceptions will be observed following terror
attacks that are organized, but hit destinations where terrorism is infrequent; and
changes will be smallest where attacks are organized and hit destinations where terrorism
is frequent.
Note that events which are unorganized are likely to be perceived as random and may
therefore not lead to increases in perceived probability. On the contrary, given the right
circumstances, they may lead to decreases in perceived probability. This logic leads to
the third hypothesis of this study:
If the gambler’s fallacy influences risk perceptions and worry after terror attacks, one
must expect risk perceptions to decline after a terror attack that hits a destination
where terrorism is very low in frequency and which has been committed by an isolated
(and captured) perpetrator. This is the only scenario that fulfils the criteria of the gambler’s
fallacy, namely the occurrence of a random event (unorganized terror attack) which is
seldom (low frequency of terrorism). In all other situations, either no change or an increase
in risk perceptions and worry is to be expected.
Summing up several assumptions on the effect of terrorism on tourists risk perceptions
and worries and possibly even travel behaviour can be made: 1. Destinations with highly
frequent and organized terrorism are perceived to be the riskiest and tourists worry most
about terror at these destinations. 2. Changes in risk perceptions and worry will be greatest
after terror attacks that are committed by organizations at destinations where terrorism is
very rare. 3. Terrorism committed by an isolated and later captured perpetrator that hits
destinations where terrorism is very rare might even reduce risk perceptions and worry
at that destination. As Reisinger and Mavondo (2005) and Sönmez and Graefe (1998)
have demonstrated, risk perceptions correlate with travel anxiety and destination




Two different samples were used to test the present hypotheses. The first data collec-
tion was undertaken among psychology minors and natural science minors at the Uni-
versity of Bergen, Norway, during two different introductory courses in 2013.
Respondents filled in a short questionnaire during a lecture break. It took students
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about 10 minutes to fill in the questionnaire and they did not receive any form of com-
pensation. Response rates were very high, about 90%. A total of 379 completed ques-
tionnaires were returned.
The second data collection was done among tourist to Norway during the summer
season of 2014. A research assistant approached participants at popular tourist sites in
Western Norway and asked whether they were tourists and whether they would fill in a
questionnaire concerning different aspects of holidaymaking. The sites were chosen
because they were low threshold sites that most tourists would visit during a trip to the
area, as for example, Mount Fløien or the Tourist Information Office both in the city of
Bergen. Inevitably, participants constitute a convenience sample from the indeterminate
population of tourists to the current area. The questionnaire was administered in
English (the translation was done by the authors) and took 15 minutes to fill in. Participants
did not receive any form of compensation. Response rates were very high, about 90%. A
total of 826 completed questionnaires were collected including participants from
altogether 57 different countries. Table 1 displays the demographics of both samples.
One-way ANOVA revealed that age and gender were equally distributed in all experimen-
tal groups both in the student- and in the tourist sample (Student sample, gender: df =
365, F = .87, p = .53; age: df = 361, F = .50, p = .84; Tourist sample, gender: df = 809, F
= .55, p = 80; age: df = 806, F = .88, p = .52).
Design
Participants were asked to imagine that they were a tourist on a roundtrip in a hypothe-
tical country that had been struck by a terrorist attack. Two characteristics of the attack
were systematically varied: (1) Frequency (whether terrorism was a high in frequency or
low in frequency in that country), and (2) degree of organization (whether the terror was
organized, that is committed by an organization or unorganized, that is committed by a
Table 1. Sample demographics.
Students
N 379
Mean age (SD) 20.78 (2.957)
Females 68.1%
Psychology minors 70.2%
Natural sciences minors 29.8%
Tourists
N 826













SD = Standard deviation.
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single and deranged individual who had been captured). This resulted in four different
terror scenarios (see Appendix for all scenarios):
(1) Low frequency/unorganized: a country where terrorism is seldom; and where the
attack was committed by a single and deranged individual who had been captured.
This scenario was meant to resemble the 22nd of July situation in Norway in 2011.
(2) Low frequency/organized: a country where terrorism is seldom; and the present attack
was committed by an organization. One might say that this scenario resembles the
attacks at Charlie Hebdo in France in 2015.
(3) High frequency/unorganized: a country where terrorism is common; and the present
attack was committed by a single and deranged individual who had been captured.
This scenario can be said to resemble gun-downs in US high schools.
(4) High frequency/organized: a country where terrorism is common; and the present
attack was committed by an organization. It is probably fair to say that this scenario
resembles the situation in Israel.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four scenarios. Within each scenario,
half of the participants read a description of the country before the terror attack and then
rated their perceived risk and worry. The other half of the participants read a description of
the country and the terror attack after the attack and then judged their perceived risk and
worry. This constitutes a 2(low/high frequency) × 2(unorganized/organized) × 2(before/
after terror) design, resulting in eight groups in both samples. This between-subjects pro-
cedure was chosen because it replicates the methods employed by Wolff and Larsen
(2014). It allows for a comparison of before and after measures, thus avoiding the influence
of memory bias.
Measures
Perceived destination risk, perceived terrorism risk, and terror worry were assessed as
described by Wolff and Larsen (2014). Destination risk was assessed as follows: How
risky is this country as a travel destination? Perceived terrorism risk was measured by the
following item: How risky is this destination regarding terrorism? And worry was assessed
by this item: How much would you worry about terrorism during this trip? All items were
answered on 7-point scales anchored by 1 – not risky/not at all and 7 – very risky/very
much respectively.
Participants in the after-terror-conditions also indicated weather terrorism risk had
changed after the attacks: Do you think the risk for terrorism in this country has changed
after the bombs? Answers were given on a 7-point scale anchored by 1 – yes, lower; 4 –
no, unchanged and 7 – yes, higher. Scores from 1 to 3 were coded as decreased risk, 4
was coded as unchanged, and scores from 5 to 7 as increased risk.
Data analysis
One-way MANCOVA and pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni correction) were used to
compare the effect of the various terror scenarios on destination risk, terror risk and
terror worry. Age, gender and whether one belonged to student- or tourist sample were
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included as covariates. Main effects for frequency and degree of organization were tested
using independent sample t-tests.
Results
Using Wilks’s lambda, there was a significant effect of the scenarios on destination risk,
terror risk and terror worry (Λ = .79, F(3271, 143) = 13.08, p < .001, partial η2 = .074).
Results also show that group differences are mainly explained by the independent vari-
able, that is, the terror scenario (see Tables 4 and 6). There is a tendency for younger
respondents to report slightly higher risk perceptions and worry than older respondents,
for women to report slightly more worry, and for students to have somewhat elevated
scores compared to actual tourists. Effect sizes for all covariates are rather small (all
partial η2 < .017). Effect sizes for the independent variable, that is, the terror scenario,
are moderate to large (partial η2 = .119–.215) (Table 3).
The main effects of frequency and degree of organization on risk perceptions and worry
can be observed in Table 2. Both in the before-terror- and in the after-terror-conditions, it is
clear that terrorism which is high in frequency results in higher risk perceptions and higher
worry than terrorism which is low in frequency. Furthermore, terrorism which is organized
results in higher perceived risk and higher worry than unorganized terrorism in both the
before- and after-terror-conditions.
Table 4 presents mean values for all four terror scenarios and displays results from pair-
wise comparisons of before- and after-terror measures. For scenario (1) low frequency/unor-
ganized (the 22nd of July scenario), there are no significant changes in risk perceptions and
worry after the terror attack compared to the before measures. However, the tendency in
the data is towards a slight increase of perceived risk and worry after the terror attack. In
scenario (2) low frequency/organized, a significant increase in all measures of perceived
Table 2. Main effects of frequency and degree of organization of terror on risk perceptions and worry.
t-test
M SD M SD df t Cohen’s d
Before terror
Low frequency High frequency
Destination risk 1.76 1.11 2.54 1.57 583 −6.92*** .57
Terror risk 1.93 1.12 2.95 1.69 583 −8.61*** .71
Terror worry 1.65 1.13 2.57 1.80 582 −7.35*** .61
Unorganized Organized
Destination risk 1.76 1.03 2.54 1.62 583 −6.98*** .57
Terror risk 2.01 1.15 2.87 1.72 583 −7.15*** .59
Terror worry 1.65 1.12 2.56 1.81 582 −7.35*** .60
After terror
Low frequency High frequency
Destination risk 2.19 1.32 2.81 1.61 591 −5.09*** .42
Terror risk 2.31 1.39 3.07 1.75 588 −5.87*** .48
Terror worry 2.14 1.43 2.82 1.79 589 −5.16*** .42
Terror change 3.97 1.38 4.12 1.32 581 −1.38 .24
Unorganized Organized
Destination risk 2.07 1.20 2.95 1.65 591 −7.47*** .61
Terror risk 2.30 1.37 3.09 1.77 588 −6.11*** .50
Terror worry 2.08 1.34 2.90 1.85 589 −6.22*** .51
Terror change 3.76 1.23 4.34 1.40 581 −5.25*** .44
Notes: Mean values on a scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high). Bonferroni adjusted criteria for significance was p = .004.
***p < .001.
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risk and worry can be observed. In the third scenario high frequency/unorganized and in the
fourth scenario high frequency/organized, no changes in risk perceptions and worry can be
observed in the after-terror measures compared to the before-terror measures.
Tables 5 and 6 display results from pairwise comparisons of the different scenarios
regarding their perceived risk and worry. It is apparent that scenario (1) low frequency/
unorganized is the lowest in the risk hierarchy, followed by scenario (2) low frequency/orga-
nized, and (3) high frequency/unorganized, and with the fourth scenario high frequency/
organized at the top of the ranking. This ranking reflects the effect of frequency and
degree of organization on risk perceptions and worry. The scenario which is neither fre-
quent nor organized ranks lowest, the scenarios that are either frequent or organized
Table 3. Results for separate analysis of covariance for risk perceptions and worry for all terror
scenarios.
Df SS MS F p Partial η2
Being a student (covariate)
Destination risk 1 9.28 9.28 5.15 .023 .004
Terror risk 1 9.84 9.84 4.88 .027 .004
Terror worry 1 18.64 18.64 8.61 .003 .007
Being male (covariate)
Destination risk 1 1.00 1.00 .56 .456 .001
Terror risk 1 2.71 2.71 1.34 .247 .001
Terror worry 1 12.88 12.88 5.95 .015 .005
Age (covariate)
Destination risk 1 5.16 5.16 2.86 .091 .003
Terror risk 1 21.45 21.45 10.64 .001 .009
Terror worry 1 10.02 10.02 4.63 .032 .004
Terror scenario (independent variable)
Destination risk 7 407.98 58.28 32.33 <.001 .166
Terror risk 7 493.08 70.44 34.93 <.001 .176
Terror worry 7 483.87 69.13 31.92 <.001 .164
Error
Destination risk 1141 2057.09 1.80
Terror risk 1141 2300.97 2.02
Terror worry 1141 2471.18 2.17
Table 4. Adjusted means for risk perceptions and worry comparing before and after terror scenarios.
Pairwise comparisons, Bonferroni correction.
Before terror After terror
M SD M SD
Low frequency – unorganized n = 146 n = 156
Destination risk 1.54 .11 1.78 .11
Terror risk 1.69 .12 1.88 .12
Terror worry 1.37 .12 1.74 .12
Low frequency – organized n = 151 n = 147
Destination risk 1.98a .11 2.63a .11
Terror risk 2.17a .12 2.74a .12
Terror worry 1.92a .12 2.56a .12
High frequency – unorganized n = 149 n = 155
Destination risk 1.93 .11 2.36 .11
Terror risk 2.30 .12 2.70 .12
Terror worry 1.88 .12 2.41 .12
High frequency – organized n = 146 n = 148
Destination risk 3.11 .11 3.31 .11
Terror risk 3.57 .12 3.53 .12
Terror worry 3.19 .12 3.31 .12
Note: Values in the same row sharing the same subscript are significantly different from each other at p < .05.
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Table 5. Results for separate analysis of covariance for risk perceptions and worry for before- and after-
terror scenarios, respectively.
df SS MS F p Partial η2
Before terror
Being a student (covariate)
Destination risk 1 .79 .79 .49 .486 .001
Terror risk 1 2.42 2.42 1.35 .245 .002
Terror worry 1 2.42 2.42 1.23 .268 .002
Being male (covariate)
Destination risk 1 3.36 3.36 2.06 .152 .004
Terror risk 1 6.36 6.36 3.57 .059 .006
Terror worry 1 11.01 11.01 5.60 .018 .010
Age (covariate)
Destination risk 1 5.15 5.15 3.15 .076 .006
Terror risk 1 5.42 5.42 3.04 .082 .005
Terror worry 1 1.56 1.56 .79 .374 .001
Terror scenario (independent variable)
Destination risk 7 192.12 64.04 39.17 <.001 .172
Terror risk 7 276.91 92.30 51.76 <.001 .215
Terror worry 7 258.00 86.00 43.75 <.001 .188
Error
Destination risk 567 926.99 1.63
Terror risk 567 1011.09 1.78
Terror worry 567 1114.65 1.97
After terror
Being a student (covariate)
Destination risk 1 11.38 11.38 5.78 .017 .010
Terror risk 1 8.36 8.36 3.72 .054 .006
Terror worry 1 21.15 21.15 8.99 .003 .016
Being male (covariate)
Destination risk 1 .14 .14 .07 .793 .001
Terror risk 1 .03 .03 .01 .913 .001
Terror worry 1 3.26 3.26 1.39 .239 .002
Age (covariate)
Destination risk 1 .95 .95 .48 .488 .001
Terror risk 1 17.41 17.41 7.75 .006 .013
Terror worry 1 9.85 4.19 9.85 .041 .007
Terror scenario (independent variable)
Destination risk 3 173.49 57.83 29.35 <.001 .134
Terror risk 3 197.53 65.84 29.33 <.001 .134
Terror worry 3 180.72 60.24 25.61 <.001 .119
Error
Destination risk 571 1125.10 1.97
Terror risk 571 1281.99 2.25
Terror worry 571 1342.86 2.35
Table 6. Adjusted means for risk perceptions and worry comparing various before-terror scenarios and









M SD M SD M SD M SD
Before terror n = 146 n = 151 n = 149 n = 146
Destination risk 1.54a .11 1.99a .11 1.94b .11 3.10ab .11
Terror risk 1.69ab .11 2.19a .11 2.30b .11 3.58ab .11
Terror worry 1.37ab .12 1.93a .12 1.89b .12 3.20ab .12
After terror n = 156 n = 147 n = 155 n = 148
Destination risk 1.78ab .12 2.63a .12 2.35b .12 3.30ab .12
Terror risk 1.87ab .12 2.74a .13 2.70b .12 3.52ab .13
Terror worry 1.74ab .13 2.56a .13 2.40b .13 3.31ab .13
Notes: Pairwise comparisons, Bonferroni correction. Values in the same row sharing the same subscript are significantly
different from each other at p < .05.
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take an intermediate position, and the scenario which is both frequent and organized is at
the top of the ranking. In other words, there is an effect of both frequency and degree of
organization on risk perceptions and worry. The more there is of both, that is, the higher
the frequency of terrorism and the more organized the terror is, the higher will risk percep-
tions and worry be.
Figure 1 displays the proportions of participants who believed that terror risk had
decreased, had remained unchanged, and had increased after the terror attacks. It is appar-
ent that in the unorganized conditions, the biggest proportion of participants believe that
the terror risk remained unchanged. Furthermore, the number of participants who believed
that terror risk had decreased is larger than the number of participants who believed that it
had increased. This effect is most pronounced in the low frequency/unorganized condition
(the 22nd of July scenario). In the organized conditions, however, the greatest proportion
of participants believed that terror risk had increased and the smallest proportion are par-
ticipants who believed that terror risk had decreased. Comparing scenarios with a low fre-
quency of terrorism to scenarios with a high frequency of terrorism reveals that participants
do not report that these scenarios differ in how much the risk of terrorism has changed fol-
lowing an attack. However, comparing terror scenarios with unorganized terrorism to scen-
arios with organized terrorism reveals that participants believe that risk has increased more
for organized than for unorganized terror scenarios (see Table 2).
Discussion
In line with the initial hypothesis, significant main effects were observed for frequency and
degree of organization. Participants reported more worry and greater perceived risk for
Figure 1. Proportions of participants who believed terror risk had changed/remained unchanged after
the terror attacks.
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destinations where terrorism was high in frequency compared to destinations where ter-
rorism was low in frequency, and for destinations where terror was committed by organ-
izations compared to destinations where it was committed by an isolated (and captured)
perpetrator. The ranking of the different scenarios according to their degree of perceived
risk and worry reflects those effects. The scenario where the terror is neither frequent nor
organized ranks lowest; the scenario where the terror is both frequent and organized ranks
highest. The scenarios where the terror is either frequent or organized hold intermediate
positions.
These findings are highly interesting and allow for predictions regarding how tourists
and others might perceive the risk of terrorism in different countries. Countries, like for
example Israel or Turkey, where terrorism is frequent and committed by organizations,
will be perceived as the most risky destinations. Countries where acts of terror are infre-
quent but committed by an organization, like, for example, ETA in Spain, together with
countries where acts of terror happen more frequently but without being organized,
like, for example, gun-downs at high schools in the USA, will be perceived as moderately
risky. And finally, countries where terrorism is infrequent and unorganized, like the Nordic
Countries or Germany will be perceived as the safest destinations. Since risk perceptions
have been shown to correlate with both travel anxiety (Reisinger & Mavondo, 2005) and
destination choice (Sönmez & Graefe, 1998), one might expect that risk-averse tourists
were least interested in travelling to counties that are ridden by frequent and organized
terrorism and most interested in visiting countries where there is no terrorism. Desti-
nations where terrorism is either frequent or organized (but not both) should be moder-
ately attractive choices.
A further hypothesis was that changes in risk perceptions and worry following a terror
attack would be greatest for a destination where terrorism is organized but infrequent, and
smallest for a destination where terror is organized and frequent. Results support this
hypothesis. The only scenario where a terror attack resulted in significantly increased
risk perceptions and worry was for the destination where terror is infrequent but orga-
nized. Comparing before and after measures reveals a tendency towards an increase in
risk perceptions and worry for most destinations after a terror event. There is one excep-
tion, the destination where terrorism is both frequent and organized. Here, no changes in
risk perceptions or worry were observed. These findings are entirely in accordance with
the psychophysics of diminishing sensitivity (Fechner, 1860) and prospect theory’s
notion of the non-linearity of probability weighing discussed above (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). This implies that the greater the perceived risk is to begin with, the
more drastic an event must be in order to further increase risk perceptions. The lower
the base line risk perceptions are, the greater the impact of an event will be on perceived
risk.
Results have similar implications as the findings discussed above. They allow for predic-
tions to be made regarding the impact of different sorts of terror on risk perceptions and
worry. In countries where terrorism is organized and relatively frequent and risk percep-
tions are relatively high to begin with, yet another terror attack may not change
people’s risk perceptions at all. However, in countries where terrorism is organized but
relatively infrequent, increased risk perceptions and worry after a terror attack are to be
expected. As discussed above, this is what Larsen et al. (2011) and Brun et al. (2011)
reported after the terror attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005.
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The most recent events with such characteristics (that is infrequent but organized ter-
rorism) are the terror attack at Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015 and the multiple and
highly organized attacks in Paris in November 2015. The fact that the public’s response to
these attacks was so enormous while terrorism affecting far more people in other parts of
the world receives relatively less attention might not only be explained by the fact that
they happened in the heart of Europe. The response may also be explained by the fact
that the attacks were committed by organized perpetrators and hit a country where ter-
rorism until now was infrequent. Thereby the attacks caused an increase in risk percep-
tions and worry, which will not be observed in other parts of the world where terrorist
attacks are horrible but far more frequent.
For the tourism industry, this finding might imply that the greatest reductions in visiting
tourists might be expected after terror attacks that are committed by organizations at des-
tinations where terrorism is very rare. However, attacks that take place at destinations
where terrorism is frequent might not have a huge impact on the visiting numbers of tour-
ists. More research is, however, needed to test these assumptions.
A further aim of the present study was to test the proposition made by Wolff and
Larsen (2014) that the reported decrease in risk perceptions and worry after the 22nd-
of-July-attacks in Norway could be explained by the gambler’s fallacy. If this was to be
the case, there should be a decrease in risk perceptions and worry in the scenario
where terrorism was infrequent and unorganized. This is because this is the only scenario
that fulfils the criteria that need to be met for the gambler’s fallacy to occur, namely the
occurrence of a random event (unorganized terror attack) which is seldom (low fre-
quency of terrorism). Results, however, do not support the hypothesis. There is no
decline in perceived risk or worry. On the contrary, when comparing before and after
measures, there is a tendency towards a slight but insignificant increase in risk percep-
tions and worry after the terror attack.
Nevertheless, asking participants in the after condition directly about whether they
thought that terror risk had changed revealed that the gambler’s-fallacy scenario is the
only scenario where the proportion of participants believing that terror risk had decreased
is clearly larger than the proportion of participants who believed that it had increased. This
lends some partial support to the hypothesis that terrorism, given the right circumstances,
might make us feel safer.
As discussed in the introduction, it is important to note that it is not the consequences
of terrorism, like increased security measures aimed at lowering the risk of terror, that
decrease risk perceptions. If this were the case, risk perceptions should decrease in all
scenarios. In the case of the gambler’s fallacy, it is the mere fact that the terror occurred
that leads people to erroneously conclude that terror risk decreased.
Results are therefore somewhat inconclusive regarding the gambler’s fallacy hypoth-
esis. The data do not lend direct support to the idea that the results reported by Wolff
and Larsen (2014) are a case of the gambler’s fallacy. It is, however, possible that the
present manipulation was inefficient in evoking the phenomenon. It is well known that
people more easily fall victim to cognitive biases like the gambler’s fallacy when they
use an affective or intuitive mode of information processing (what has been labelled
system (1), then when they employ more deliberate and controlled modes of information
processing (labelled system (2); Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). It is possible
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that the 22nd of July event evokes more emotions and thus intuitive reasoning than a
hypothetical terror scenario, thereby making people more susceptible to the gambler’s
fallacy. Future research might find better ways to evoke more intense emotions in order
to study this phenomenon in a more realistic setting.
Nonetheless, one may conclude from the findings that terrorism committed by an iso-
lated and captured individual at destinations where terrorism is very rare will not increase
risk perceptions for that destination and hence most probably not affect the number of
visiting tourists negatively.
The use of hypothetical scenarios is in fact a limitation that concerns the present inves-
tigation in general. Such scenarios might evoke somewhat less intense, possibly less
emotional responses than actual events. If this, as discussed above, leads to a more cog-
nitive or controlled way of information processing, subjects might estimate risks differ-
ently than in an ecologically more valid, or realistic setting. This shortcoming is,
however, offset by the advantages that come with employing experimental designs.
Only in this way can different characteristics of terrorism be manipulated, making it poss-
ible to conclude something about their causal effect on risk perceptions and worry. Future
research could look at the ecological validity of the present findings. Still, results of field
studies reported by Larsen et al. (2011), and Brun et al. (2011) do seem to support the eco-
logical validity of the current investigation.
Another limitation concerns the fact that only convenience samples were employed.
This might of course limit the generalizability of the findings. The rather large number
of participants at least partly makes up for this weakness. It is also important to keep in
mind that even though the two samples are really quite different (a sample of Norwegian
undergraduates and a sample of tourists to Norway from all over the world), findings were
entirely parallel. It is therefore reasonable to assume that findings are generalizable also to
other populations. Apart from that, there is simply no way of recruiting random or even
representative samples of tourists as they constitute a not clearly defined and ever-chan-
ging population.
To sum up, findings revealed that both the frequency of terrorism and its degree
of organization do influence people’s risk perceptions and worry. Participants
report greater risk perceptions and worry for terror attacks that are frequent and
for terror attacks that are committed by organizations. The highest risk perceptions
are reported for terror that is both frequent and organized, the lowest for terror
that is infrequent and unorganized. Findings also show that the largest changes in
risk perceptions are to be expected for terror that hits a destination where terror is
infrequent but organized, and the smallest changes in risk perceptions will occur at des-
tinations where terror is frequent and organized. One cannot rule out the
possibility that terrorism, given the right circumstances, namely being infrequent and
unorganized, can even reduce risk perceptions. More research is needed to illuminate
this question.
The present investigation is unique, in that it moves beyond simple case studies and
employs experimental methodology to look at specific causal effect of varying character-
istics of terrorism on tourists risk perceptions and worry. In doing so, it provides a taxon-
omy over how people perceive the risk of terrorism and over how their risk perceptions
will change in response to diverging sorts of terror.
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Two terror characteristics were varied, frequency and degree of organization, resulting in
four different scenarios. There was a before terror and an after terror version for each of the
four scenarios resulting in a 2 × 2 × 2 design. All measures are between subjects, that is,
each participant read only one scenario, either the before or the after version.
Italics were added in the after terror versions of the scenarios.
Scenario 1: low frequency/unorganized
Imagine the following country: A small country with a couple of millions of inhabitants.
Crime rates are low and the country did not participate in any wars during the last 50
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years. Prosperity and level of education are around the average of the western world.
Unemployment rates are also low.
The country is a democracy with regularly held elections, and the political life is orga-
nized into different political parties and interest organizations. Two population groups live
in this country. The majority group populates the entire country, and a small minority
mainly populates one area of the country. This country is known for its pleasant
climate, its beautiful nature and its culinary specialties. Since the end of World War II,
no acts of terrorism have been carried out, until some months ago when 50 people were
killed in two car bombs. An isolated individual has claimed responsibility for the killings.
The perpetrator’s motives for committing these acts of terror are unknown and it is doubtful
that he is mentally sane.
The perpetrator clearly operated alone and has been arrested. He has admitted the crime.
Imagine that you are a tourist on a round trip in this country.
Scenario 2: low frequency/organized
Imagine the following country: A small country with a couple of millions of inhabitants.
Crime rates are low and the country did not participate in any wars during the last 50
years. Prosperity and level of education are around the average of the western world.
Unemployment rates are also low.
The country is a democracy with regularly held elections, and the political life is orga-
nized into different political parties and interest organizations. Two population groups live
in this country. The majority group populates the entire country, and a small minority
mainly populates one area of the country. The minority wishes a separation of this area
in order to establish an independent state. To accomplish this, the minority has organized
a political party. Several decades ago, this organization also used acts of terror in order to
achieve separation. Since the end of World War II, however, no acts of terrorism have been
carried out, until some months ago when 50 people were killed in two car bombs that the
organization claimed responsibility for.
A perpetrator who belongs to the organization has been arrested and has admitted the
crime.
Imagine that you are a tourist on a round trip in this country.
Scenario 3: high frequency/unorganized
Imagine the following country: A small country with a couple of millions of inhabitants.
Crime rates are low and the country did not participate in any wars during the last 50
years. Prosperity and level of education are around the average of the western world.
Unemployment rates are also low.
The country is a democracy with regularly held elections, and the political life is orga-
nized into different political parties and interest organizations. Two population groups live
in this country. The majority group populates the entire country, and a small minority
mainly populates one area of the country. This country is known for its pleasant
climate, its beautiful nature and its culinary specialties. Since the end of World War II,
acts of terrorism have been carried out repeatedly by isolated individuals in this
country. The latest one happened some months ago when 50 people were killed in two car
bombs that an isolated perpetrator has claimed responsibility for.
The perpetrator clearly operated alone and has been arrested. He has admitted the crime.
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Imagine that you are a tourist on a round trip in this country.
Scenario 4: high frequency/organized
Imagine the following country: A small country with a couple of millions of inhabitants.
Crime rates are low and the country did not participate in any wars during the last 50
years. Prosperity and level of education are around the average of the western world.
Unemployment rates are also low.
The country is a democracy with regularly held elections, and the political life is orga-
nized into different political parties and interest organizations. Two population groups live
in this country. The majority group populates the entire country, and a small minority
mainly populates one area of the country. The minority wishes a separation of this area
in order to establish an independent state. To accomplish this, the minority has organized
a political party. This organization is also known for their use of acts of terror in order to
achieve separation. Since the end of World War II, recurrent acts of terrorism have been
carried out. The latest one happened some months ago when 50 people were killed in two
car bombs that the organization has claimed responsibility for.
A perpetrator who belongs to the organization has been arrested and has admitted the
crime.
Imagine that you are a tourist on a round trip in this country.
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